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Marxism, logic, and the law of the tendency for
the rate of profit to fall
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I am not on a campaign to demolish Marxism. I am writing this note partly
because I published a couple of articles [Hir04, Hir96] relating to Marxism and,
decades later, I now think I was wrong on a number of points, so I would like
to clarify my own argument, mainly for my own benefit. But also, for political
organisations aiming for the overthrow of Capitalism and particularly for such
organisations where the importance of political theory is emphasised, it seems
to me that the adoption of a mistaken theory could be a serious handicap to
their success.
One worry about Marxism, as Martin Hyland once pointed out to me, is
that it is a theory of everything. Marxism is a theory of history, politics, class-
struggle, natural science, philosophy, religion and economics, but the underlying
theory, dialectics, claims to be a logic of change and interaction of processes in
full generality. The track record of theories of everything is not good and while
that in itself is not enough to rule Marxism out, it does place a greater burden
of proof to provide a clear justification — either empirical or logical – for all its
claims. Because its claims are so ambitious, we should require a higher level of
proof than we do for, say, the licensing of a new drug.
Dialectics and Logic My main point here, is that the foundations of Marx-
ism are unscientific. By a scientific theory I mean a theory based on evidence,
using logic. Both parts of this definition are problematic, the question of evid-
ence it tied up with the notion of interpretation, and what is meant by logic
needs to be clarified. Nevertheless, I take this as a useful definition of Science.
It is widely accepted that science must be based on evidence. But of course
science is not simply the process of collecting evidence, a scientific theory will
be based on evidence and deduces a general understanding of a topic based on
logical reasoning from the evidence. What counts as a logical argument may
depend on the field. But it should include a clear definition of any non-standard
terms, any assumptions that are being made, and it should be clear how each
statement or proposition follows from either evidence, from assumptions, or
from what has gone before in the argument. In formal logic, simple rules are
given that allow you to deduce new statements from old (e.g. Socrates is a man,
all men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal). In other branches of science
1
a more informal approach is commonly accepted, however in a scientific theory
each step in an argument must be clearly justified and it should be possible
to formalise them if required. If a step in the argument cannot be formalised,
rather one is asked to think deeply about what is claimed until enlightenment is
received, then it seems to me that the argument is unreliable and unscientific.
This is often where theories go wrong.
Marxists often employ a different notion of logic. According to Engels (see
[Eng1883, Eng1877] for example), and many Marxists (e.g. [Rees98]), the dia-
lectical laws of contradiction exist not only in the realm of thought, but in reality
too. These ideas derive fairly directly from Ancient Taoism (in particular, the
three laws of the dialectics, below, were known to the ancients). Accordingly, a
statement can be both true and false simultaneously. The contradictions that
exist in reality should be understood as the engine of the process of change
and transformation. Dialectics is proposed as a generalisation of formal logic
(which is considered static and non-interacting) that applies to processes of in-
teraction and flux. I have written elsewhere about how it is false to portray
formal logic as a technique that cannot apply to properties that change over
time or to processes of interaction. Here, however, I take issue with the idea
that contradictions exist and that it is possible to reason forward from actual
contradictions in a useful way.
Whereas in everyday conversation, a contradiction in an argument is seen
as a good reason to reject that argument, in Marxism contradictions are not
only permitted, they are an essential part of an argument1. But the idea that
a statement can be both true and false is problematic. The word “not” has
a logical meaning, which we learnt long before we had heard of Marxism or
logic. When we say that x is not the case, we mean to exclude the case where
x is true. By claiming that x is true and not true, we are being inconsistent.
This kind of argument is not persuasive. When Matt Hancock argued that the
UK was avoiding testing as a strategy for COVID in March 2020 and argued
that this was because Science showed that testing would not save lives, and
anyway the Government were testing, the contradiction does not strengthen
the argument, rather it undermines it. When we claim that p is both true and
false, we undermine our argument because both statements cannot both be true
to reality, so something we have said is clearly false. According to very simple
laws of propositional logic, if we take both p and NOT p as assumptions we
may draw any conclusions whatsoever. Bertrand Russell may have said once
(although I cannot track down a reference) that the weaker the logic, the more
surprising the conclusions.
Although there are three laws of dialectics, these laws turn out to be more like
topic headings (the law of unity, the negation of the negation, the transformation
of quantity into quality) and they do not offer a way to deduce one thing from
another, nor do they tell you when one argument follows logically from another.
1There are formal logics that deal with contradictions, e.g. paraconsistent logic. The in-
tention here is to deal with inconsistent, contradictory information and try to resolve those
inconsistency. The idea is not that contradictions exist in reality, rather they consider data-
bases of information which may not be reliably true.
There have been quite a few cases where deductions have been claimed, based
on the laws of dialectics — for example, Hegel’s proof that the number of planets
could only be seven, or Engels’ proof that an electron must travel in a circular
orbit — but these arguments are not scientific.
Value Marxism distinguishes itself from the wider political left by an interest-
ing analysis of exploitation and profit. The general anti-capitalist view is that
capitalism is based on exploitation and is therefore sinful, being contrary to a
natural concept of fairness. Marx shares this view, but adds that exploitation
is also the root cause of a problem for the Capitalist system that dooms it.
Exploitation leads to a rise in the organic composition of capital, which leads
to a fall in the rate of profit. This is the central content of the thesis elaborated
by Marx in the three volumes of Capital [Mar54]. According to this thesis, the
Capitalist system is a transitory system which cannot last long. The reason
that it cannot last long is that a mechanism built-in to the nature of Capitalism
leads to a long term tendency for the rate of profit to fall. This mechanism
works as follows. The rate of profit is defined as the ratio S
C+V
, surplus value
divided by total costs. In order to improve productivity, over time the organic
composition C
V
will rise and consequently (assuming some bound on the rate of
exploitation S
V
) the rate of profit will fall.
Here I will argue that the argument stated above is logical, given certain
assumptions, but at least one of the assumptions (a bound on the rate of ex-
ploitation) is unjustified. A consequence is that I do not know how long the
Capitalist system will last.
But first, lets examine some issues in this formulation of the theory. In the
statement “The Capitalist system is transitory and cannot last long” and in the
phrase “long-term tendency”, we might ask, what counts as long? All previous
economic systems have turned out to be transitory, so we might have guessed,
without reference to the three volumes, that Capitalism will end eventually, but
Marx’s thesis suggests more: that Capitalism will last significantly less time
than previous systems, in particular significantly less than the thousand years
of Feudalism. After two centuries of Capitalism it can certainly be argued that
insufficient time has elapsed for us to see this, on the other hand, the more
time that passes without an end of Capitalism, the more problematic this is for
Marx’s thesis.
A second preliminary comment is that the theory makes use of quantities,
like C, V, S, the rate of profit etc., and these quantities require an explanation
in the theory — an explanation that provides numerical values for these quant-
ities. Without such an explanation we cannot infer that a certain ratio of these
quantities will fall. In Marx’s writing there appear to be a number of types of
value: exchange value, necessary labour time and underlying value.
The exchange value of a particular commodity tells you the ratio that you
expect to exchange this commodity for other commodities, under average con-
ditions. Given certain assumptions about fluidity in the market, the exchange
value of a commodity may be represented as a certain number in such a way that
two commodities with the same number as their exchange value would represent
a fair exchange, i.e. the sort of exchange you would expect to be able to make,
in average conditions. More generally, the ratio between exchange values of two
commodities tells you (inversely) the ratio that you expect to exchange quant-
ities of each commodity. The monetary price of a commodity is an indication
of its exchange value2. On the face of it, the exchange value of a commodity
should be observable and measurable, but as a result of enormous complexities
relating to currency exchange rates, hidden costs and subsidies, it is very hard
to establish reliable exchange values in practice.
The necessary labour time for a commodity is what it says, the duration of
all the work needed to produce the commodity, measured in hours. It has to
be modified to take into account the fact that some types of labour are more
valuable than others. A skilled worker may be able to produce more value in
one hour than an unskilled worker, so an adjustment is needed to take this into
account. It gets complicated because the skill is itself a commodity that may be
purchased and the value of that skill would then be determined by the amount
of labour needed for the necessary instruction of the worker. There is a danger
that we are already losing track of exactly what we mean by “necessary labour
time”, however we will overlook such difficulties here.
The underlying value is the true value of a commodity, when distortions and
illusions created by the system are removed. It is not directly observable or
measurable, but it is needed to understand the behaviour of exchange value,
labour time and everything else. It is the holy ghost of this value trinity3. The
Law of Value is sometimes invoked to explain the connection between these
different types of value, but the definition of this law of value varies considerably
and is nowhere stated precisely.
One version of the Law of Value is the Labour Theory of Value (LTV).
According to this, the exchange value of a commodity is determined by the
amount of labour that is required for its production. The problem, of course,
is that LTV is empirically and systematically false. Because of the equalisation
of profit rates between different sectors of the economy, the exchange value
of a commodity will differ from that predicted by LTV. Marx was aware of
2Its an interesting problem to find conditions which are necessary, or sufficient, for a
meaningful exchange value to be defined, and to construct other models which summarize the
patterns of exchange of commodities in situations where a global exchange value cannot be
defined. I might look at that further some other time, here we may assume that an exchange
value is well-defined.
3Unobservable, hidden parameters may well be required in order to explain how Capit-
alism works, but any theory which adopts such parameters needs particular justification —
either empirical or logical — of how these hidden parameters can be used to obtain a correct
understanding of observable things, like the collapse of capitalism. To illustrate a problem
with the notion of a discrepancy between observed values and true underlying values, consider
the well-known Newtonian equation f = ma. Imagine a physicist postulated that the true
law was f = mv but because of certain peculiarities in the way we observe these quantities,
we should multiply the right hand side of the equation by a
v
to account for the illusion that
is observable to us. The true law is f = mv but after adjustment it seems (superficially)
that f = ma. The argument would be discounted, if for no other reason that it falls foul of
Occam’s razor by introducing unnecessary and unobservable properties.
this problem and referred to it as the transformation problem4. Marx argues
that there is a transfer of underlying value from labour intensive industries to
capital intensive industries, caused by the equalisation of profits. This means
that the exchange value of a commodity will differ from the necessary labour
time. Since LTV is false, Marx’s theory still requires an account of how values
are determined5.
One weak version of the law of value states merely that all value originates
with labour. The problem with such a weakening of the law is that Marx’s
thesis concerns numerically valued quantities, like the rate of profit, so the
theory must explain and provide numerical values, and the weakened law of
value says nothing about quantities or values. Without a quantitative account
of underlying value it is hard to see how it is possible to prove that the rate of
profit will fall.
A stronger version of the law of value states that underlying value is de-
termined by necessary labour time, but makes no assertion about a relation-
ship between exchange value and underlying value. However, what counts for
Capitalists when making investment decisions is the exchange value of the com-
modities they (have their workers) produce. The true underlying value is of no
interest to them, what matters is what they can exchange their commodity for.
Capitalists will happily invest if they expect that the rate of profit, measured
by exchange value, is high, it won’t trouble them one bit if the rate of profit,
measured by underlying value, is low.
Since it is exchange values that matter to capitalists, Marx’s theory must
explain why the rate of profit, measured as a ratio of actual exchange values,
tends to fall if the organic composition rises. Having adopted a definition of
value (here we use exchange value, since it is well-defined) let us state and
examine the argument for the declining rate of profit.
Our assumptions are that (i) the organic composition C
V
rises without bound
(ii) but the rate of exploitation is bound say S
V
≤ b, (iii) V > 0 and (iv) there
is a positive lower bound on the rate of profit, below that bound Capitalism
cannot continue, say S
C+V
> ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Then
S
C + V
≤
bV
C + V
≤ b
V
C
The first inequality follows from assumption (ii), the second follows from as-
4All the same, for much of volume 1 of Capital, Marx gives the strong impression that he
is using the LTV. In his laboriously worked examples he estimates that values produced by
a worker over the ten hours of a working day, e.g. 4 hours for capital costs and depreciation
costs, 3 hours for worker’s own wage, 3 hours for the boss.
5It is true that Marx and marxists have written extensively about the relation between
underlying value and exchange value. Explanations are given as to why the rate of profit rose
in particular periods of history. It might be that in a certain period, Capitalist were able
to raise the rate of exploitation, or the organic composition did not rise, or perhaps that a
chunk of value was stolen from one sector and deployed in another, somehow causing the rate
of profit to rise. Such arguments are based on hindsight. What they do not give is a way
of working out, given data about an economy, how these quantities (exchange value, rate of
exploitation, organic composition, etc.) will interact and how to work out what the rate of
profit will be.
sumption (iii). Since C
V
is getting bigger without bound (assumption (i)) it
follows that the rate of profit, being less than bV
C
, gets arbitrarily small. When
the rate of profit falls below ǫ, or earlier, Captalism must end, by assumption
(iv). It all works, its logical. But note that if we drop any one of our four
assumptions, the conclusion does not follow.
It may be of interest to note that the argument from the four assumptions
to the conclusion that the rate of profit must fall to arbitrarily small levels,
does not depend on the use of underlying value, nor of necessary labour time,
it works equally well using exchange value as a measure.
The first assumption is that over time in order to raise productivity, invest-
ment will tend to shift into capital intensive forms of production, hence the
organic composition of capital tends to rise. However, productivity can also be
increased by investing more intensely in the value of labour-power. The value
produced by a highly skilled worker in one hour can greatly exceed the value
produced by an unskilled worker. All investment in education and welfare can
be considered as a cost of production counted as variable capital V . Given that,
it is not clear that there has to be a tendency for the organic composition of
capital to rise. Empirical evidence may help with this question, although even
if historically the organic composition has risen, this would not prove that it
will rise without any bound.
The second assumption, that there is an upper bound on the rate of exploit-
ation, is also problematic. If we are assuming that the organic composition of
capital rises without bound it is easy to conceive that the rate of exploitation
also rises without bound. With a very high organic composition of capital a
worker will be highly productive. The cost V of his/her labour need not be
correspondingly high, it is only required that V covers the cost of keeping the
worker at a basic level of health and strength. It is not clear why the rate of
exploitation could not be arbitrarily high. The third and fourth assumptions
are not problematic.
The contrapositive of the argument above shows that assuming (i), (iii) and
(iv) we may deduce that while Capitalism continues, the organic composition
of capital will increase without bound.
In summary, I find the various notions of value in Marxism confusing, in
particular the so-called Law of Value is most unclear. The value that is well-
defined (though hard or impossible to measure) and critical for the health of
the economy is exchange-value. Using exchange-value as a measure of value,
Marx’s argument for the declining rate of profit is a logical consequence of four
assumptions. However, those assumptions are doubtful and without all four of
them we have no proof of a long term tendency for the rate of profit to become
arbitrarily small. I do not doubt that Capitalism, like all previous systems, will
end. It is clearly a dynamic system prone to booms and destructive slumps. It
is quite conceivable that a slump more severe than previous slumps will occur
before very long and that this would wreak enormous damage to our lives.
Whether Capitalism could recover from such a slump, perhaps in a new form,
or whether a new economic system would emerge, remains open. The nature of
any new system that might arise from such a crisis is a matter of speculation.
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